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MANAGERS AT WORK
Alan L. Porter, Elmer Yglesias, Alisa Kongthon,
Cherie Courseault, and Nils C. Newman
GET WHAT YOU NEED FROM TECHNOLOGY
INEORMATION PROOHOTS
"Why don't technology managers want our analyses?
And what can we do about it?" This was the title of our
effort to contrast the perspectives of analysts and
managers in a 2001 SCIP (Society of Competitive Intel-
ligence Professionals) presentation (7). The issue struck
a chord with both sides. Analysts feel frustrated that their
hard work is under-appreciated; managers feel frustrated
that they're not getting the information they want, when
they need it.
Empirical technology analyses can take many forms,
including: competitive technological intelligence, and
technology forecasting, foresight, roadmapping, and
assessment (2). Such analyses can aid various technol-
ogy managers and professionals, including CIOs, R&D
managers, new product development managers, opera-
tions managers, IP managers, strategic planners, and the
Executive Suite.
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And that leads us to our questions: Why do these
empirical technology analyses not play a stronger role in
technology management? And what can we do to
enhance this role?
Utilizing Research Knowledge
As technology analysts in the mid-1990s, we were
bubbling with enthusiasm for our version of empirical
technology analyses (5). We thought that technology
managers would quickly grasp the value and develop an
insatiable appetite. Instead, after some hundred studies
(conducted for companies, agencies and universities),
we recognized something was wrong.
Accordingly, we turned to the National Science Founda-
tion for support to research the issue. The resulting three-
year project identified serious impediments to
knowledge flow. The Center for Innovation Manage-
ment Studies (CIMS) supported a follow-on study that
elicited 32 case experiences (4). This article reports what
we learned.
We are not alone in discovering that utilization of tech-
nology analyses in decision-making is not automatic.
Colleagues in management science and operations
research, policy analysis, statistics, program evaluation,
and patent analysis have expressed similar concerns.
"Knowledge Utilization" can claim to be a field unto
itself, with journals dating back several decades (5).
Issue, content, context, and presentation all affect the
utility of findings (6-9).
Decision-makers trust familiar sources. In general,
knowledge derived from empirical analyses is less
familiar—consequently less relied upon—than tacit
knowledge from a respected colleague. A 1999 Harvard
Business Review article (10) distinguished use of
codified knowledge, stored in databases, from personal-
ized knowledge, delivered face-to-face. Surprisingly,
technology managers seem to utilize empirical analyses
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much less than some other managers. Examples include:
accounting measures that support exacting control over
financial processes, statistical quality control that
informs production management, and the use of rapid
quantitative assessments to help determine whether to
alter marketing programs. In contrast, technology
managers seem to rely more heavily on expert judgment
and managerial intuition.
Getting the Analyses You Need
Our conceptualization of what affects the utility of
empirical technology analyses keys on two roles: the
prime user (i.e., the manager/customer) and the technol-
ogy analyst. Each may actually involve multiple persons.
In particular, "the user" may involve a sequence of
people who authenticate and filter findings that contrib-
ute in various ways to complex business decision
processes. We label the technology analysis findings as
Technology Information Products (TIPs) to convey the
notion that these are deliverables, and they can take
multiple forms. Our sole evaluation criterion is the extent
to which decision-makers gain value from the TIP—we
don't address validity or other considerations.
Guided by this conceptualization, we digested the
lessons from our case studies and experiences to yield
eight factors that can affect your getting TIPs that make a
difference in your decision-making. The Table, next
page, presents these in the form of a "TIP-sheet." We
now discuss each of the factors.
1. Know Thy Analysts—Interact with your analysts to
recognize their strengths and figure out how to compen-
sate for their weaknesses (e.g., particular technical bent,
communication skills). Don't allow a reclusive analyst to
"toss the report over the transom" to you. Conversely,
make sure the analysts understand your needs and pref-
erences. Share ideas on how the study can maximize its
impact. In our cases, strong rapport between manager
and analyst was the best predictor of a useful TIP. Have a
beer together!
2. Get Involved—Highly-utilized TIPs are characterized
by user-managers being involved throughout, both in the
study formulation and analytical process. One analyst
told us that "the reason the influence was high was
because we could so quickly analyze all the different
'what-if scenarios that the client had and come back
with viable data. . . . In some cases, we added to the
model when the client was sitting there with us. . . .
Hence, the consumer understood the tool and the
approach of the analysis well."
Effective TIPs respond to expressed user needs rather
than having the analyst decide what's interesting. As Joe
Coates puts it, a goal is to avoid surprising the client.
Continual interaction can avoid being "jolted" by a
report (77).
Express explicitly what you need and when. Discuss the
types of information to be used, analytical methods and
assumptions, so you are comfortable with them.
3. Enhance the Organizational Climate—This factor
warns not to assume that others will be receptive to the
technology analysis. Assess the likelihood of resistance,
determine its roots, and take appropriate advance action
to warm the climate.
Well-used TIPs apply familiar, credible methods. Also,
one analyst noted that the study was accepted by the
organization because "the report was respectful of
people (getting them involved, their opinions were
respected and used, the threat of the results was
respected), and the report was factual and realistic. I had
my boss' backing, and the report provided meaningful
options."
Some warning signals:
• New technologies tend to be perceived as disruptive.
• Successful units tend to be less receptive to new ideas.
• People are likely to feel threatened by a call for
change, such as different skills or downsizing.
In a politicized environment, get senior management
buy-in ahead of dissemination and open deliberations.
For a strange, new technology, directly explore its impli-
cations for your organization.
4. Work together to build credibility—The Table spot-
lights three facets: respect for the analyst, authority given
the information product, and acceptance of the methods
used.
The majority of interviewees perceived the analyst's
credibility and that of the methods used as a necessary
condition for acceptance. Reputation and experience are
critical if the analyst is from outside the organization.
One interviewee, whose TIP was not effectively used,
stated that "what affected the credibility of the study was
the mismatch between users and presenters in terms of
interests, age, experience, etc."
Respondents overwhelmingly confirmed that including
experts in the development and analysis of a TIP adds to
credibility. A way to boost credibility is to enlist trusted
associates, especially internal experts, to help sell the
analysis. Start small—successful projects can be
expanded. Evaluate technology analyses to determine
what worked and why. Then, tout your analysts'
successes to the organization ("this study led to that
decision, which made us $1 billion!").
5. Encourage vivid reports—At least ten interviewees
claimed vivid findings caught their users' attention.
Convince your analysts that you and other users should
take away an explicit, memorable finding or action
implication from every TIP.
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Technology Manager's TIP-sheet (How to get what you
need from technology information products)
Manager-Analyst Environment:
1. Know thy analysts:
• Understand their skills and orientation; adjust or team
as needed.
2. Get involved:
• In formulating the analysis.
• In the analytical process.
3. Enhance the organizational climate:
• Get your organizational unit(s) receptive to new
information.
• Interest significant others in formulating and using the
study too.
• Reassure those you worry might feel threatened by the
study.
• Budget the TIP appropriately.
Information Characteristics (the TIP itself):
4. Work together to build credibility:
• Assure the analyst's credentials are properly appreciated.
• Endorse the TIP and seek endorsement of other pivotal
executives.
• Understand the analytical methods and be sure they are
clear to other key users.
5. Encourage vivid **#@!#*!! (memorable) reports.
6. Assure the TIP is on time for decision-making.
7. Be clear on what TIP content is needed:
• The right blend of information for taking action.
• Answers (as opposed to raising more questions).
8. Assure the best possible communication:
• Be clear as to the right level of detail for each key user.
• Get analysts to personally communicate with each key
user.
• Arrange to have findings presented interactively (2-way
feedback).
• Demand TlPs customized to each key user's preferred
style, as feasible.
As one interviewee related (paraphrased): We analyzed
the patent portfolio of another company whose technol-
ogy development clashed with our own. We showed that
the potential payoffs of acquiring this company far out-
weighed those of working around their patents. Presen-
tation of sharp contrasts in the benefit/risk ratios served
to change the mind of the senior manager. What was
striking, that senior manager had opened the meeting to
decide on action by categorically rejecting this possibility.
One key to vivid presentations is information visualiza-
tion. Paul Germeraad, former V-P at Aurigin Systems,
related the success of their patent analysis software to its
compelling 3-D landscapes of a patent environment.
Executives could immediately comprehend the threat in
overlapping interests or the opportunity posed by an
empty "whitespace." The message here is clear: analysts
ought to work to provide "hooks" that their users grab
onto.
6. Assure the TIP is on time for decision-making—
Certainly, TIPs must be available in time for strategic
decision-making. For 18 studies, the time to conduct and
finish the analysis was rather short (e.g., two days to
six months, with an average at about two months). Don't
let your analysts get away with their tendency to analyze
to death, no matter how long that takes. Providing first-
cut results, on a schedule, helps the timing and targeting
of issues, with e-mail as an alternative rapid delivery
vehicle. We find great promise in software that can
automate routine processing steps, thereby dramatically
speeding up many technology analyses. One multina-
tional reported reducing the time of a key competitive
technology intelligence report from three months to three
days. That makes a qualitative change in what analyses
can be relied upon in technology management.
7. Be clear on what TIP content is needed—How should
analysts package and present their findings? We discern
multiple dimensions, including proper scope, the right
decision focus, and "hooks." The best hooks explicitly
associate analytical findings to issues known to be of
concern to the target user. For instance, it's good to report
back on whether the "option suggested by Vice-
President VP" makes sense. Or, to show how a technol-
ogy development strategy is likely to affect our unit's
bottom line.
Highly-utilized TIPs match users' preferences. In fact,
the majority of favorable cases indicate a concern not
only for technical issues, but they also cover the business
strategy and cost implications essential to the decision at
hand. In contrast, less-utilized TIPs are more apt to report
negative outcomes.
We distinguish three types of TIP focus: routine, antici-
patory and responsive. Our case results support the desir-
ability of explicit responsiveness. In one instance, an
Executive Suite advisor described his deliberate efforts
to convert anticipatory or routine work to responsive by
actively engaging the customer in interim reviews. Put
another way, he worked hard to make the report "belong
to" the prime customer. Conversely, we suggest you, as
user-manager, be proactive in expressing what you want.
Spell out what constitutes directly usable information.
For many analysts, this means suppressing copious
auxiliary information, making it available on request.
Our cases suggest that analysts should restrain them-
selves in posing many new questions. Have analysts
address uncertainties and estimate risks to help you
assess the TIP and reach decisions. Demand that analyti-
cal processes be as transparent as possible, with a
suitable blend of numerical, text and graphical materials
for the target user community. You may want to receive
analytical results in "bite-size" pieces to avoid informa-
tion overload and to provide interim feedback.
8. Assure the best possible communication—In most suc-
cessful TIP cases, the analyst communicates directly to
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the prime customer and to other users. Dynamic presen-
tations can allow users and analysts to perform "what if?"
analyses in real time during a meeting. Encourage your
analysts to suitably tailor their TIPs. For example, one
interviewee mentioned, "The format used for presenta-
tion depended on the group. Some presentations were
open discussions; some were interactive discussions
with the model; and some were high-level outcome pre-
sentations with several main points for executives."
Don't accept a "one size fits all" solution if it's just the
easy way out. As one analyst/manager cautioned us—we
need to revise analysts' natural tendency to allocate
"95 percent" of their energies to the analysis and
"5 percent" to presentation; a better target is closer to
50-50.
To Sum Up
Get directly involved with your analysts to ensure you
get the infonnation you need, when you need it, in the
form you want.
One of the most exciting changes we see taking place is
the standardization of decision processes. We have
observed two multinationals introduce required TIPs
into their strategic business decision processes. In one
company, R&D and IP management use stage-gate
processes. These require explicit technology analyses
and explicit TIP forms at each decision stage. This stan-
dardization, while not without dangers, offers huge gains
in analytical efficiency and managerial familiarity.
Our bottom-line message is that empirical technology
analyses can enhance your managerial performance. But
this takes proactive collaboration with your analysts.
You probably need to change their behavior, in line with
the TIP-sheet's eight considerations. And taking full
advantage of the knowledge derived from the amazing
repositories of R&D and business information entails
change on the part of technology managers too.
Empirical technology analyses do improve decision
processes. We predict that, within a decade, gains from
this richer technology management information will
cause managers who avail themselves of it to succeed,
while dooming exclusively "intuitive" managers to
failure. As analogies, we note the advent of empirical
i e irectly invoM
ipyoupanali^to
it, in the form
you want.
decision support that has revolutionized financial, opera-
tions and marketing management. ®
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